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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In Appellee's brief the State correctly states the standard that must be 
shown for ineffective assistance of counsel, namely that" a defendant must first 
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, in that in fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and rebut the strong 
presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy." "Second, the defendant must show that 
counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial- i.e., that if affected the 
outcome of the case." (Appellee Brief p. 8 quoting State v. Litherland, UT 76 
19,405 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.668, 
687-89 (1984). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANT SHOULD BE 
OVERTURNED OR REMANDED BECAUSE OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Where the parties disagree is in the application of this test to the facts of 
the case at bar. Appellant argues that his counsel fell below the standard for a 
reasonable attorney in that she Med to call the witnesses that he told her would 
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be able to establish an alibi for him at the time that the fire was reported. These 
witnesses would have also testified as to what he did with the gasoline that he 
bought at the service station. He also argues that she was ineffective in that 
during cross examination of the State's witness information was brought out that 
(a) Appellant was known by the police as a drug dealer, Trial trans, p.76 lines 2-
3 and p. 77 6-10; (b) that the police had previous dealing with Appellant ( Trial 
trans. P. 76 lines 7-16;) That the police thought that his apartment smelled like 
marijuana. ( Trial Trans. P. 76 lines 18-24. (D) that there was a warrant out for 
him for intoxication and reckless burning. Trial trans. P. 78 lines 18-24 and (e) 
that if Appellant gave the officer his pipe that he would be cited and released on 
marijuana and paraphernalia charges. (Trial Tran. P. 85 lines 1-13). 
A. LENGTH OF BRIEF 
Appellee attacks the argument be stating that claims are inadequately 
briefed. (Br. Of Appe. At 6). Counsel cites State v. Lucero, 47 P.3d 107(Utah 
App. 2002) and compares the length that the court found to be inadequately 
briefed at six pages to the three-and a-half pages of text in Appellant's 
argument. (Br. Of Appe's p.7) Appellant takes issue with comparing his brief 
with that found to be inadequate in Lucero. In that case the Court of Appeals 
found that ..."Rule 24 [of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure] requires that 
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an appellant's brief contain [a] statement of the issues presented for review. 
Including for each issue; the standard of appellate review with supporting 
authority; and (A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in 
the trial court... Utah R. App. P. 24(a)5(A). In addition, this rule requires that 
the argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue 
not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on." Lucero at p. 55. The Court of Appeals went on 
to hold that Lucero had railed to cite where in the record the issues concerning 
insufficiency of evidence or improper statutory interpretation were preserved for 
appeal, second that he failed to set forth the proper standard of review, and third 
that he failed to include any relevant citations, authority or meaningful legal 
analysis that would support his allegations that the evidence was insufficient. 
Lucero at 55. 
Appellee does not contend that Appellant brief is deficient in the areas of 
tailing to cite where in the record the issues concerning insufficiency of 
evidence or improper statutory interpretation were preserved for appeal, or that 
he tailed to set forth the proper standard of review, or that he railed to include 
any relevant citations, authority or meaningful legal analysis, he only states that 
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the brief is too short. Long writing is not better writing, and brevity can be 
helpful. 
If Appellant was too brief in his initial brief he will expand on the issues 
raised therein. The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Chacon, 962 P.2 48,49 
(Utah 1998) that an appellant "must meet the heavy burden of showing that (1) 
trial counsel rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) counsel's deficient 
performance prejudiced him. [An appellant] must therefore identify specific 
acts or omissions that fell outside the wide range of professional assistance and 
illustrate that, absent those acts or omissions, there is a 'reasonable probability' 
of a more favorable result." Appellant will analyze the allegations one by one. 
B. FAILURE TO CALL WITNESSES 
In his brief Appellant cites to the many ways in which he feels that his 
counsel rendered deficient performance. (See Appl. Br. p. 4-6) Each of these 
problems prejudiced Appellant in different ways, but as a whole must be seen as 
creating a situation where Appellant presented no defense to the charges brought 
against him and was made to seen by the jury as a drug user. It is required that 
an attorney do more than just show up at a trial to meet the standard of effective 
assistance of counsel. This trial was quite short. The State rested, the defense 
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presented no evidence by noon. (Trial trans. P. 102) Defendant did not testify, 
none of the witnesses that he had asked his counsel to call were present and 
were not called. He basically presented no evidence. The trial transcript 
correctly shows that no evidence was presented by Appellant. (Trial trans, p. 
104) The State in this case relied on the incident at the bar earlier and the 
testimony of the clerk at the Bonanza service station to establish motive and 
opportunity. The rather vague testimony of the clerk, Tracy Lyons, that 
Appellant said " watch and in 45 minutes it was going to go up in smoke" (Trial 
trans, p.26 lines 10-18) was the only statement of any kind that connected him 
to the fire. If he had been able to present evidence mat he went back to his 
apartment, had used the gas to burn ants and had not gone back to the bar or the 
area that night, this rather inclusive statement could have been seen in a much 
different light by the jury. Counsel alluded to these facts in her opening, (Trial 
trans, p. 8.), so it was obvious that she knew of the alibi of the Appellant, but 
she did not call any witnesses to give life to these defenses. Under the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure 77-14-2, counsel was required to advise opposing counsel 
of alibi evidence at least ten days in advance of trial. Here the record on appeal 
shows that no filing was made. The record is very clear that in all ways counsel 
failed to present the evidence that Appellant believes would have established 
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that when the fire broke out he was not in the area. Further that he had another, 
legal purpose for the purchase of the small amount of gasoline. 
It is important to note that Appellant had been excluded from this same 
bar before, and had been later allowed to return. After he promised to behave he 
was allowed back in the bar. (Trial Trans, p. 20) There were no allegations that 
he made any attempts at retaliation at that time. There was never given any 
reason why he should be that much more upset this time. The evidence 
presented did not at any time place him in the area of the fire at the time of the 
fire directly only by the circumstantial evidence of him buying gasoline, and the 
statement reported by Ms. Lyons above. The jury had no other evidence to 
weigh or consider because no witnesses were called. Because Defense 
discussed some of these ideas in her opening argument, and then failed to 
present any evidence concerning them, it brought to the jury the strong idea that 
no defense was possible. This was strongly prejudicial to Appellant. 
C. STATEMENTS OF APPELLANT'S PRIOR INVOLVEMENT 
WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Appellant contends that the cross-examination of State's witness that he 
had prior dealings with the law was further evidence of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. (See Appellant's brief p. 4) Appellee argues that this line of 
Page-6-
questioning was done by counsel as "trial strategy" (Appellee's Brief p. 11) He 
also states that the information obtained in this questioning "only highlighted 
vague and unproven allegations about defendant's connection with drugs, it was 
innocuous." If it was the strategy of counsel to show that the officer was 
prejudiced against the Appellant, she could have chosen lines of questioning that 
would have not included information for the jury concerning allegations of and 
possession of drugs and a drug pipe. (Trial Trans. P. 85) The use of drugs was 
not an allegation in the case at bar, but the jury was given every reason to 
believe that the Sheriff's office in Duchesne considered Appellant as a drug 
user. To the normal conservative jury in Utah this kind of information puts 
Appellant in a very bad light. Counsel could have asked the same officer if he 
had any reason to dislike Appellant or if he had any prior information that the 
witness' description of the suspect was Appellant or many other questions to 
show prejudice if that was what she was trying to show. Instead she opened 
areas of questioning that were not opened by the prosecutor into prior bad acts 
that were not refuted in any way by any witness. 
Appellee states that "the questioning only highlighted vague and unproven 
allegations about defendant's connection with drugs, it was innocuous. No 
evidence suggested that defendant had any involvement with drugs. To the 
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contrary, the questioning suggested that defendant was not connected with 
drugs." (Pgs 11-12 of Appellee's brief) 
Contrary to Appellee's contention however, the testimony given by 
Deputy Mark Nielsen was that this deputy had been looking for Appellant for 
having his apartment smell like marijuana (Trial trans. P. 76 line 18-19) That 
there was a warrant out for his arrest for intoxication and reckless burning. 
(Trial Trans. P. 78 lines 15-22) and that if Appellant gave the officer his pipe 
that he would be cited and released on marijuana and paraphernalia charges. 
(See Trial Tran. P. 85 Lines 1-13) None of these "facts" are "innocuous". They 
are direct attacks on the reputation and character of Appellant. These also 
create in the minds of the jurors the impression that Appellant is not a good, law 
abiding person. The information concerning the "reckless burning" has the 
reflection that he was involved with burning or fires. This could only have been 
prejudicial to the Appellant. 
D. COUNSEL'S DEALING WITH THE FIRE MARSHALL. 
Appellee next states that Appellant's objection to the handling of the 
testimony of the Fire Marshall is frivolous. Appellant objected to the manner in 
which his attorney dealt with the Fire Marshall in not going into his credentials, 
the rather strange opening statement when talking about the witness (see Trial 
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Tran. P. 97), and the tact that she did not ask for any authorization for any 
witness to rebut the testimony of the Fire Marshall. The Appellee's brief is full 
of the same impression that the jury was given, i.e. That the testimony of the 
Fire Marshall is unassailable. Defense counsel was given notice of the State's 
intention to use Mr. Borg as an expert witness on June 29,2001, within the 30 
day time limit that is required concerning expert witnesses. There is no 
indication that she was given a copy of the report from Mr. Borg, but it is 
expected that she knew what his testimony would be prior to trial. Defense 
counsel had time to have requested for permission to hire another witness to 
testify concerning the fire. It is a very rare scientific procedure that would be so 
infallible as to have no possible refutation to opinion, methodology or other 
impeachment of the testimony. However, none of this was done. This may 
seem very frivolous Appellee, but to Appellant the introduction of evidence 
almost totally unrebutted is very serious. Whether or not he would have been 
qualified as an expert, for his attorney to have merely stipulated that "We're 
willing to stipulate that he is an expert in the field of, I guess, it wouldn't be 
starting fires, but the field of fires, whatever..."(Trial Tran. P. 90 lines 14-17) 
This statement gave the jury every impression that the testimony of the fire 
marshal was not subject to question. She did not question the methods that 
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were used in his investigation, only whether or not he could tell that the fire was 
started by gasoline. (See Trial Tran. P. 97-100) The handling of the fire marshal 
as an expert witness is another way in which his attorney Med to behave in a 
reasonable manner to provide a defense to the charges brought before the court 
n. THE STATE FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF 
PROVING THE ELEMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 76-6-103 
and 76-4-101. 
Appellee correctly states that Appellant has the burden of" [overcoming] 
a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of evidence for a jury verdict." 
State v. Gonzales, 2000 Ut. App. 136,2 P.3rd 954. Further that "[appellate 
court] will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and all 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, [it] finds that 
the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. 
Silva, 13 P.3rd 604 (Ut. App. 2000). Appellee then says that Appellant's claim 
must fell because he "foiled to marshal the evidence supporting the jury's 
verdict." (Appellee's brief p. 14.) Therefore foiling to meet the burden imposed 
by Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) of "marshaling all record 
evidence mat supports the challenged findings." West Valley City v. Majestic 
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Investment Co., 818P.2d 1311,1315 (UtahApp. 1991) 
Appellant however, did marshal the evidence that was given at the trial. 
"The testimony of the officers in the case was that a garbage can in the 
back of a building had burned. There was testimony that the garbage can was 
right up against the back of the building. (See Trial Transcript p. 62 lines 6-25 
and p. 63 lines 1-12). The State Fire Marshal testified that the fire was 
intentionally started by a flammable liquid, he believed that hydrocarbon based 
liquid had been put into the can and ignited on fire. (See Trial Transcript p. 95 
lines 8-12) 
There was the testimony of the convenience store clerk that a person that 
was complaining about being 86ed from the Wells Club bought a small amount 
of gasoline in what she described as a coffee cup. (See Trial Transcript p. 25-
27). Later the case officer obtained a search warrant to search the residence of 
the defendant for a coffee can. (See Trial Transcript p. 68 lines 22-25) A coffee 
can was found at the defendant's residence but it did not appear to have had 
gasoline in it. For some unknown reason the coffee can that the officer did not 
think had had gasoline in it was introduced into evidence. (See Trial Transcript 
69 lines 1-13). There was no container that contained or had contained gasoline 
found at defendant's residence. 
Mr. Wells appears to have been convicted mainly on the testimony of the 
clerk from the convenience store who stated that Mr. Brooks had said "Just 
watch. Its going to go up." (See Trial Transcript p. 26 lines 10-18, p.30 lines 
9-14 and p. 31 lines 1-22) It was assumed by the clerk that he meant the Wells 
Club because he had complained of being 86ed. Richard Kent testified that he 
saw the fire as first one flame and then another, and men another. (See Trial 
Transcript p.53 lines 1-13). This person saw the flame, but never saw Mr. 
Brooks in the area. (See Trial Transcript p. 56 lines 9-12) The fire went out so 
fast that he did not even call the fire department. (See Trial Transcript p. 55 
lines 15-17 and p. 56 lines 20-23). 
Ms. Bake, a friend of Mr. Kent also saw the fire but did not see anyone in 
the area. (See Trial Transcript p. 41 lines 1-10)." Quoting Appellant's Brief 
pages 7&8. 
Appellee further seems to miss the argument that Appellant is making. 
Appellant's argument concerning the State's case is that there was no evidence 
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introduced concerning all of the elements of the statute. 
Mr. Brooks was charged with violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-
103 and 76-4-101. The jury instruction given in the case states that the elements 
of the crime are "(1) by means of fire or explosives, (2) intentionally and 
unlawfully (3)attempted to damage a habitable structure; or any structure 
(4)when a person, not a participant in the offense, is in the structure. 
Appellant concedes that the State introduced evidence that the jury could 
have relied upon to show that there was (l)a fire, (2) that the fire was started by 
gasoline and was therefore likely intentionally started. What Appellant argues 
that the State foiled to show was that there was evidence introduced to show 
that the fire was intended by whoever started it (3)to damage a habitable 
structure, when (4) someone not a participant in the offense is in the structure. 
The evidence was that the garbage can was always tied to a fence about 
ten feet from where is was found the night of the fire. (Trial tran. P. 67 lines 15-
25 and p. 68 lines 1-8.) Deputy Nielsen testified that the can was found behind 
the wall of the Wells Club. (Trial tran. P. 62 lines 17-20) The can was found 
right up against the wall. (Trial tran. P. 63- lines 8-12) The photo that was 
introduced shows a wall with the sign of the Wells Club on it with the garbage 
can in front of the wall. The wall is stained in many places, but it does appear to 
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have some marks above the garbage can. (See Addenda) The officer testified 
that these appeared to be scorch marks from the fire. (Trial trans. P. 61 lines 17-
20 and p. 62 lines 1-7) This is the only evidence that was introduced 
concerning the burning of the building. All the other evidence was concerned 
with the burning of the garbage can. There was no evidence concerning any 
gasoline on the building, or other flammable material placed near the building, 
only that the can was placed near the building. 
The clerk from the convenience store stated that Mr. Brooks had said 
"Just watch. Its going to go up." (See Trial Transcript p. 26 lines 10-18, p.30 
lines 9-14 and p. 31 lines 1-22) This is the only evidence introduced to show 
any intention on the part of the Appellant. This is such a vague statement, that 
could have meant so many things. However, the jury could have adduced from 
this statement that he did intend to burn something. The clerk assumed that he 
meant the Wells Club. The State never introduced any evidence that would 
have tied the burning of the garbage can to the intention of burning the building. 
This being so the Appellant could have been found guilty of reckless burning, 
but not attempted arson. If the person that did the burning would have intended 
to burn the building, they would have taken a step to burn the building. The 
testimony was that the fire had been accelerated by gasoline. Officer Nielsen 
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smelled gas in the garbage can. (Trial trans. P. 65 line 8) and Fire Marshall Borg 
testified that gasoline was used in the fire in the garbage can. (Trial Trans. P. 95 
lines 11-12) If the person that had started the fire in the can had intended to burn 
the building, there would have been evidence of something done to burn the 
building. There was none. No smell of gasoline was on the wall, no rags had 
been placed to start the fire on the wall, nothing except the can was moved close 
to the building. It is unreasonable to assume that this is sufficient action to 
show an intention to intend to burn the building. 
For the reasons stated above Appellant asks that his conviction for 
Attempted Aggravated Arson be overturned. 
Dated this C? day of March, 2003. 
CINDYcMRTON-COOMBS 
Page-14-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigaed hereby certifies that on thefc7 day of March, 2003, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief was deposited in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid addressed to: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Jeffrey T. Colemere 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South Sixth Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Appellee 
Page -15-
ADDENDA 
Page -16-

